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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE MEDIA:
THE PUBLIC'S CLAIM FOR A RIGHT OF ACCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of electronic media has been accompanied by the assertion
of first amendment free speech interests by both broadcast license holders
and the listening and viewing public. The unique nature of government
regulated media for expression has brought constitutional guarantees into
play, but no clear-cut standard for determining whose interests should pre-
dominate has been developed. The focal point of the debate involves the
presentation and treatment of controversial issues of public significance,
such as foreign policy, pollution and fiscal policy, among others. The
power of presentation has heretofore been in the hands of the broadcasters,
who wield virtually unlimited control over the subject matter, perspective
and mode of that which fills the airwaves daily. The only restriction im-
posed upon license holders with respect to controversiality is adhesion to a
general guideline of fairness.
The opposition to this asserts both a lack of compliance with fairness
standards and a constitutional infirmity in vesting complete control of
media of expression in the hands of those who are merely licensed to
operate the facilities as a commercial venture. Emphasis is on the latter
argument, with particular reference to the inconsistency of the concept of
freedom of expression with the current system of exclusive control. A
counter-argument holds that a well articulated and carefully supervised
policy requiring fairness in presentation will cure present inequities and
offset any detriment to freedom of expression that prevails under the present
system of exclusive control by broadcasters. This note explores the strength
of both sides of the controversy, examining constitutional and non-constitu-
tional arguments, and analyzing one federal case, Business Executives'
Alove for Vietnam Peace v. FCC,' which marks a significant breakthrough
for those who advocate a right of access. The court held that the first
amendment does not allow a broadcaster to reject paid public issue adver-
tisements while accepting paid commercial advertisements and directed the
FCC to establish reasonable administrative regulations to deal with editorial
advertising. Whatever the practical difficulties of implementation of
the court's order,' the judicial recognition of a conclusive but limited right
of access to the electronic media was long overdue.
'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(consolidated for hearing with Democratic National Committee v. FCC), cert. grarnted,
U.S. -, 31 L Ed. 2d 230 (1972).
- See 85 HARV. L REV. 689 (1972).
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II. HISTORY OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Governmental control of the electronic media did not begin until the
creation of the Federal Communications Commission. At that time televi-
sion was still in its infancy, but radio was well established as one of the
most effective vehicles for the presentation of ideas. The express purpose
of the FCC was to insure that both radio and television would never func-
tion inconsistently with "public convenience, interest, or necessity. .. ."
The FCC did not feel compelled to promulgate any specific rules regard-
ing first amendment rights until 1949. At that time, pursuant to the power
delegated to it by Congress, the FCC formally announced its policy with
respect to editorial opinions and expression by broadcast licensees. The
FCC recognized the "paramount right of the public in a free society to be
informed and to have presented to it for acceptance or rejection the differ-
ent attitudes and viewpoints concerning ...vital and often controversial
issues which are held by the various groups which make up the community."'4
This meant that a licensee was obligated to present news and comment
"on a basis of overall fairness, making his facilities available for the expres-
sion of the contrasting views of all responsible elements in the community
on the various issues which arise." 5 This principle quickly evolved into tie
fairness doctrine, which was to be the guide for all future policy decisions
involving the interaction of free speech and the electronic media. The
import of the doctrine is that a licensee must present all sides of any con-
troversial public issue if he presents any side at all. For example, a station
campaign to encourage passage of a tax levy would have to give some
(but not necessarily equal) time to opponents as well as proponents of the
issue. The requirement is simply that once a controversial issue is raised,
the public must be given a "reasonable" cross-section of representative
views on it.
The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine went unquestioned at the
time of its publication. Though Congress has never legislated with respect
to the fairness doctrine itself, support for the FCC's policy can be inferred
from the 1959 amendment to the equal time provision for political candi-
dates,6 which stated in part that "[n]othing in the foregoing sentence shall
be construed as relieving broadcasters ... from the obligation imposed upon
them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
public importance."' In response to a growing number of fairness com-
3 Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 303 (1964).
4 Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Editorializing Report].
5id. at 1250.
6 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
7 Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat.'557, amending 47 U.S.C
§ 315(a) (1964).
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plaints which centered largely around the lack of substantive guidelines
associated with the fairness doctrine, the FCC published the "Fairness Pri-
mer"." This public notice reiterated the role of the fairness doctrine in
situations of broadcast facilities being used for the discussion of controver-
sial issues of public importance and further sought to clarify ambiguities
inherent in its application. The method adopted was a digesting of FCC
rulings on what qualified as a controversial issue of public importance,'
the nature of the licensee's obligation to afford reasonable opportunity for
the presentation of contrasting viewpoints,'0 what constituted a reasonable
opportunity,"- what limitations a licensee could impose,'- and what obli-
gations accrued to the licensee in situations of personal attacks 3 and
editorializing.' 4 Each category represented undisturbed rulings of the FCC,
except for licensee editorializing, which simply contained the assertion that
editorializing was subject to fairness doctrine constraints, but that the
licensee was under no affirmative obligation to editorialize.' It was the
applicability of the fairness doctrine to personal attacks and licensee edi-
torializing that ultimately invoked Supreme Court intervention in its only
comprehensive statement on the subject, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC.16
-Red Lion was a consolidation of two cases, one involving the constitu-
tionality of the fairness doctrine's requirement of reply time for an indivi-
dual personally attacked on the licensee's facilities, and the other involving
specific regulations adopted by the FCC governing both personal attacks
and political editorials as mentioned in the Fairness Primer. The broad-
casters in each case sought to have the FCC rulings overturned as unconsti-
tutional abridgments of their freedoms of speech and press. In a far reach-
ing decision, a unanimous Supreme Court emphatically upheld the fairness
doctrine, noting the "public interest" responsibility that inheres in the
exclusive dominion over a broadcast frequency and stating that "we think
the fairness doctrine and its component personal attack and political edi-
torializing regulations are a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated
authority."'17 On the issue of free speech, the Court pointed out that "the
people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends
8 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Primer].
9 Id. at 10416.
So ld. at 10418.
31d. at 10419.
12d.
131d. at 10420.
14 1d. at 10421.
15 d.
16 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
17 Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,385 (1969).
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and purposes of the First Amendment."' 8 In addition, the court stated that
"[ilt is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by
the FCC."' 9
III. IMPACT OF THE FAIRNEss DOCTRINE
Although Red Lion marked a significant victory for advocates of the
fairness doctrine, it left untouched the inequities that were developing in
the implementation of the doctrine. These inequities were a result of the
gap between the doctrine's broad mandate of reasonable representation of
contrasting views and the practical difficulties of enforcement in light of
the voluminous and diverse expression that fills the airwaves.
A. Fairness Doctrine Standards
One of the most litigated problems involves the establishment of dis-
cernible standards for invoking the fairness doctrine. The original and
lone criterion laid down by the FCC is "whether a controversial issue of
public importance is involved . -'2o The difficulty inheres in defining the
terms "controversial" and "public importance." Surprisingly, some topics
which may be thought of as inseparable from a connotation of contro-
versial are, in fact, insufficiently controversial to meet the somewhat nebu-
lous standards of the FCC. Religion is just such a topic; prominent in
numerous public modes are the "is God dead?" debates and court deci-
sions concerning prayer in the public schools. In Madalyn Alurrayl
religion's controversiality disappeared. A majority of the Commissioners
did not think the broadcast of church services, devotionals, and prayers re-
quired allocation of time to respond for anti-religious groups, 2  and two
concurring Commissioners thought that religion raised no controversial is-
sue whatsoever. The only way a controversy could develop, said the Com-
missioners, would be "if a sermon in a religious broadcast presents a view-
point on a controversial issue of public importance, such as a bond issue
or the nuclear test ban treaty. ... Another public issue is that of mili-
tary conscription. Military recruitment announcements have resulted in
several suits asserting the applicability of the fairness doctrine. In Daid
C. Green2" the Commission determined that solicitation of recruitment
is Id. at 390.
'9 Id.
20 Fairness Primer, supra note 8, at 10416.
2140 F.C.C. 647 (1965).
22 Id.
23Id. at 665 (Henry and Cox, Comm'rs., concurring).
2424 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970).
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could raise the controversial issue of "whether the United States at this
time should maintain armed forces" and also the controversial issue of the
propriety of the draft system.2 5 However, in Alan F. NeckritzYG and San
Francisco Women for Peace 7 the Commission reviewed similar recruitment
announcements, but stated that no controversial issue had been raised.128
An apparent inconsistency has also developed in the context of the fair-
ness doctrine and commercial advertising. In Banzhaf v. FCC-" the court of
appeals affirmed, but narrowed, a Commission decision declaring the fairness
doctrine applicable to cigarette advertising. The standard settled upon was
that if the use advocated posed a threat "to life itself" the opposing view
deserved representation. ° But in Friends of the Earth3 ' the Commission
said that an environment group failed to establish that automobile and gaso-
line advertisements advocated the use of something which posed a sufficient
public health problem, air pollution. Although the FCC reached a con-
trary result, Friends of the Earth differed little in its approach to a contro-
versial issue of public importance, as was indicated by Commissioner John-
son in his dissent when he noted that the only relevant question is whether
or not advocacy of use raises an issue of controversy and public importance
sufficient to invoke the fairness doctrine. 2
B. Some Fairness Doctrine Problems
Aside from semantical considerations, there exists the question of proper
disciplinary action by the FCC when a complaint results in the discovery
of a legitimate fairness doctrine violation. The sanction available to the
FCC is revocation of a broadcasting license for the wilful or repeated viola-
tion of any rule or regulation of the FCC,3 and licenses must be renewed
every three years. However, prior to Red Lion, non-renewal had never
been imposed for enforcement of the fairness doctrine, and probationary
renewal of less than the maximum three year period was highly infrequent.
The problem, of course, is that such a sanction is inordinately harsh for a
small or unintended infraction of the doctrine. The most appropriate
system of adjudication would combine expediency with a sanction compara-
ble to the severity of the violation.
Several other problems exist which are inherent in the fairness doctrine,
251d. at 172.
26 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 501 (1971).
2724 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970).
28 Alan F. Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175, 176 (1970); accord, San Francisco Women for Peace,
24 F.C.C.2d 156, 157 (1970).
29 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
30 Id. at 1097.
3124 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970).
32 Id. at 753 (Johnson, Comm'r., dissenting).
3347 U.S.C. § 312(a)( 4 ) (1964).
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but not as readily susceptible of overt analysis as those discussed above.
One of the most frequent allegations is that the fairness doctrine, which
is intended to maximize the exchange and dissemination of ideas,
actually operates to inhibit free expression. This stems from the fact that,
as the licensee is under no affirmative obligation to present any controver-
sial issue whatsoever, he may avoid any issue which might require either
expenditures in order to comply with the fairness doctrine or result in possi-
ble litigation and sanction; hence broadcasting is, on the whole, more bland
than it would be without the fairness doctrine. Indirect influences upon
programming may also severely distort the intent of the fairness doctrine,
yet not be reached by utilization of the doctrine. No doubt a commercial
sponsor's opinion about the nature and quality of a broadcast station can
be very influential. That opinion might easily impede the objectives of the
fairness doctrine and the first amendment itself by persuading the licensee
to retreat behind the "no affirmative obligation" shield when ideas, the
adverse of which are objectionable to the sponsor, are available to the
licensee for presentation. Such a situation is far from unimaginable in an
industry that is heavily dependent upon those very sponsors for economic
livelihood.
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR A RIGHT Or. ACCESS
Increasing difficulty with the fairness doctrine has prompted specula-
tion as to constitutional theories which might make the media more respon-
sive to the public's first amendment rights. A theory heretofore rejected by
the FCC is the "right of access" theory, which holds basically that the public
is entitled to pay for and communicate its ideas on public issues through the
media in the same manner that a commercial advertiser does. The theory
has finally acquired judicial approval through Business Executives' AMoie
for Vietnam Peace v. FCC,34 in which the court decisively announced
the existence of a limited right of access to the media held by the public.
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) is a national
organization dedicated to ending the war. It believed that one effective
method of demonstrating its opposition would be to broadcast spot an-
nouncements on local radio stations in much the same way commercial ad-
vertisers do. Station WTOP in Washington, D.C., refused, over a period
of eight months commencing in June, 1969, to sell any time to BEM. The
reason given was not any management disposition towards the anti-war
announcement, but rather a long standing station policy of not selling time
to any group seeking to influence the public on controversial issues.
To persuade the court of appeals to reverse the FCC holding against a
3 4 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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right of access,"' BEM sought to establish that: (1) radio is an appropriate
forum to which first amendment constraints should apply; (2) the fairness
doctrine fails to fully protect the public's first amendment interests in free
speech in the media; and (3) a right of access cures the constitutional
defects of the fairness doctrine, yet does not lose its constitutionally pre-
ferred position by virtue of creating undue hardships on the licensees.
A. Radio Stations Subject to First Amendment Constraints
That the first amendment does not apply to private individuals or
corporations is both self-evident3 6 and well entrenched in judicial opinion.
It "limits only the action of Congress or of agencies of the federal govern-
ment . . ."I' It is, however, applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Since BEM had requested advertising on a privately owned
radio station, the first obstacle to invoking first amendment rights was to
show why the guarantee of freedom of expression must be observed by a
business corporation. In short, it had to be proven that not only is the
government prohibited from interfering with a licensee's right to free
speech, but that a licensee is obligated to respect the public's free speech
interest in the media that he controls.
The "state action" exception to first amendment immunity is the
vehicle for such proof, though only by analogy to the prevailing conception
of the constitutional doctrine:
The reach of the First Amendment, therefore, depends not upon "public"
-- 'private" technicalities, but upon more functional considerations. They
are (1) the governmental involvement in or public character of a particular
enterprise, and (2) the importance or suitability of that enterprise for the
communication of ideas.38
Case support is abundant for the conclusion that radio stations are within
the reach of the first amendment under both suggested standards.
In Marsh v. Alabama3 9 the Supreme Court held that members of a
religious sect could not be prevented from distributing religious literature
in a town that was wholly privately owned. The rationale was that a town
is of such a "public character" that no individual or company could assume
the functions of government without respecting constitutional guarantees.
More closely analogous to the concept of broadcasting as state action is
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,40 in which the state leased
property to a restaurant which discriminated on the basis of race. Although
35 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. I provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press."
3 7 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
381d. at 651.
39 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
40 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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distinguishable as a case grounded in equal protection, the similarity of
licensing and leasing is strong, especially in light of the similarity of the
concepts of franchising and broadcast licensing. Directly in point is
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollock,41 a case which held that a transit
authority regulated by a federal governmental agency (in Washington,
D.C.) was subject to first amendment constraints by virtue of that regula-
tory relationship. A plethora of equally pertinent cases and authority42
would seem to make the conclusion of first amendment applicability to radio
inescapable.
B. Adequacy of the Fairness Doctrine
The fairness doctrine discussed above has been advanced as the media's
shield against constitutional attack. The question of whether or not a
right of access is constitutionally compelled is never reached, so goes the
argument, if the fairness doctrine sufficiently protects the public's free
speech interests. The adequacy of the fairness doctrine can only be deter-
mined, however, by juxtaposing the requirements it makes of the licensee
with the scope and extent of the public's first amendment rights.
The court in BEM held that the public has three very crucial interests
in the media: the public has a first amendment interest in the mode or man-
ner-as well as the content-of public debate aired on the broadcast media,
in vigorous, "wide-open" public debate, and in effective self-expression.4"
The key to the argument for a right of access hinges upon the interest of
self-expression, which basically means that "[w]e all have an interest in
speaking up ourselves as well as in hearing others. ' 14  If the fairness doc-
trine does not provide for the actualization of that interest, then it is con-
stitutionally defective. The court clearly rejected the notion that the fair-
ness doctrine is sufficient to preserve the public's interest in self-expression.
In fact, it noted two distinct shortcomings. First, since the initiative as to
what is to be presented is, without exception, at the discretion of the li-
censee, the system must necessarily conform to a "paternalistic structure in
which licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues are 'important,' how
'fully' to cover them, and the format, time, and style of the coverage.""
Inherent biases, therefore, would always prevent optimum fairness so long
as the licensees exercise all the initiative. Second, the broadcaster's editing
control will invariably result in a less than fully informed public, even if
the bias is a product of simple oversight.40
41343 U.S. 451 (1952).
42 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1969); Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 249 (1970) (John-
son, Comm'r., dissenting).
43flusiness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
44 Id. at 655.
451d. at 656.
46Id. at 657.
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C. Establishing a Right of Access
Once the defense of the fairness doctrine is laid to rest, the two-pronged
issue that remains is: (1) does a right of access overcome the shortcomings
of the fairness doctrine; and (2) does its importance outweigh the possible
detriment to the licensees. The efficacy of requiring licensees to accept
some editorial advertising is implicit throughout the court's opinion. The
terminology lends itself to justification under the court's standard, e.g., the
word "access" obviously allows for entry into a given field, which goes to
the issue of initiative for introducing or commenting upon issues of public
importance being shared by the licensee and the public. In the case of
editing and format, absent censorship by the broadcaster, the individual
or group seeking access can devise an editorial advertisement in whatever
manner or mode deemed appropriate for expressing a particular perspec-
tive. The conclusion reached by the court was that "the fairness doctrine's
goal of full and fair coverage of issues on normal programming time does
not eliminate the public's interest in a further, complementary airing of
controversial views during advertising time." '4
The ability of a right of access to rectify existing defidences does not,
in and of itself, compel its adoption. First amendment rights depend upon
the context in which they are to be upheld. Justification for governmental
abridgment has been the subject of intense litigation, beginning with the
original "dear and present danger" standard. 8 Due to the variety of con-
texts in which first amendment rights arise, it is necessary to determine
which test is applicable before reaching the question of whether or not the
facts, as related to the test, establish a right of access.
The first standard discussed by the court was the "access to forums"
test, which "is an exercise in balancing, though weighted in favor of First
Amendment values."4' 9 Hence the value of granting free speech is balanced
against the "importance of other uses of the forum which may be threat-
ened and the extent to which they actually will be disrupted." ° The dis-
ruptive effect must override the "preferred" first amendment right. The
propriety of utilizing this test rests on two assumptions. First, the court
must equate access to a place of communication, for example, a public park,
with access to a medium of communication. The court perceived little
difficulty in such an equation, relying both on the internal logic of such
an analogy and on recent, confirming authority in similar cases for such a
conclusion."' The second assumption is that since the first amendment
rights of both the public and the licensee are at issue, one should predomi-
471d. at 658.
48 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
49 Business Executives' Move for Vietmam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
gold.
51 Id. at n.1
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nate and thereby be recognized as deserving the "preferred" position in a
balance of interests. Placing the public's right to be fully informed above
that of the licensee to broadcast what he wishes seems to be a natural
product of the public's "paramount" right in the media. 2
The second standard explored by the court was the compelling interest
aspect of the "new" equal protection. Basically the doctrine holds that
where a state discriminates either on the basis of a suspect criterion, for
example, race, or in the deprivation of a fundamental right, for example,
free speech, that such state action can be justified only by the showing of
some "compelling interest" being served. Stated another way, either ac-
tion constitutes a prima facie constitutional violation. The court suggested
that both branches may be available for invoking the strict standard of
review. On one hand, discriminating between commercial advertisers and
editorial advertisers utilizes a suspect criterion, because to allow some pub-
lic speaking implies a lack of objection to public speaking in general,53
and on the other hand, to prevent editorial advertising is to infringe the
fundamental right of freedom of speech, 4 hence the broadcaster's policy
must be supported by a compelling state interest.
With these alternatives before it, the court declined to choose just one,
but rather combined them into what it called "a very heavy burden of
justification."55 The FCC, in turn, characterized this burden as: (1) throw-
ing the program equation off balance; (2) favoring those private interests
who can afford to dominate available advertising time; (3) usurpating of
the licensee's authority in judging what constitutes adequate coverage; and
(4) financially oppressing licensees granting free time to groups opposing
the view of a paid editorial who cannot afford to purchase time. 0
Far from finding these considerations a heavy burden, the court seemed
to feel that they are almost no burden at all. The "lost authority" argu-
ment was dismissed on the grounds that "[s]uch a modest reform would
not substantially undermine broadcasters' editorial control over their fre-
quencies. ' 57  This conclusion was apparently drawn from the often re-
peated admonition that the decision only requires broadcasters to accept
some editorial advertising, in accordance with such "reasonable regulations"
as the FCC may develop. Further, these "reasonable regulations" will per-
mit the FCC to prevent abuses of the right of access by wealthy interest
groups, thus disposing of the "money domination" argument. Likewise,
reasonable limits on the number of advertisements that need be accepted
52 RedLion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969).
53 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
541d. at 660.
55 Id. at 662.
5 6 Brief for Respondent at 22-25, Business Executives' Move lot Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450
F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
57 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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will avoid the "economic ruin" anticipated by the FCC as a result of the
interaction of a right of access with the fairness doctrine's requirement of
free time if need be to respond. The court's final determination was that
"[gliven a scheme of reasonable regulation, there is no reason why accept-
ance of editorial advertising should cause any substantial harm or disrup-
tion not already involved in the acceptance of other advertising." 53
V. BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE DECISION
Before examining the soundness of the court's reasoning, it should be
noted that two distinct constitutional approaches emerged, and it is not en-
tirely dear which was being relied upon. On the one band, an analysis of
the fairness doctrine reveals constitutional deficiencies that are inseparable
from its administration and consequently render it unconstitutional. The
deficiencies arise from a lack of opportunity for self-expression, since all
initiative and editing control of media coverage for controversial public is-
sues rests with the licensee. The court believed that a limited right of
access overcame these deficiencies without creating any undue burden on
the licensee. However, the court also indicated that the public has a "para-
mount" right in the operation of the media, hence an offer of air time to
one segment of the public, commercial advertisers, means that it must be
made available to the public in general. This latter approach disdains
any compromise between the constitutional rights of the public as opposed
to those of a licensee, positing the right of access as independent of other
doctrinal policy.
A. Two Rationales for a Right of Access
Those who contend that the fairness doctrine is constitutionally defec-
tive believe that the public has an interest in the media as speakers, as well
as viewers and listeners. Without this premise, the deficiencies mentioned
above disappear, along with any need for a right of access. The premise is
open to two opposing lines of argument: (1) that the public does not have
an interest as speakers; and (2) that, assuming that some speaking interest
exists, the fairness doctrine satisfies it.
The first line of argument was adopted by the FCC in its original
opinion. BEM there claimed that the Supreme Court's language in Red
Lion describing "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences": 9 evidenced
that Court's belief in the public's right as speakers. The FCC dismissed
this with the observation that "it is clear that in this passage the Supreme
Court was stressing the essential nature of the fairness doctrine, rather than
the right of a particular spokesman to obtain access to the air, except in
58M. at 665.
59 Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969).
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cases of personal attack and editorials endorsing or opposing political candi-
dates." '00 The second line of argument was employed in the dissent in
BEAI in the court of appeals. This argument asserts that whatever right
to speak might exist does not, in and of itself, compel a right of access if
it is reasonably satisfied under the fairness doctrine. Rather, it is subsumed
under a general right to know and the fairness doctrine "provides a mech-
anism for implementation of the public's right to know which, by and
large, has been effective."'O
The "paramount right" approach avoids all discussion of the fairness
doctrine and the specific elements of the public's first amendment rights
in the media. This is accomplished by examining advertising in general
from an equal protection standpoint. This is to say that discriminating
against editorial advertisers, as opposed to commercial advertisers, amounts
to using a suspect criterion, i.e., the content of ideas, which is constitution-
ally prohibited absent a compelling state interest.02
Little attention was paid by the court to the process of getting from a
"federal government involvement" finding to the strict standard of review
associated with equal protection. Though the court did point out that
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to federal regulation of the
broadcast industry, since no interference with the states is involved,"O'a it
later, and without explanation, stated that "discrimination apparently based
on the content of ideas presents an additional, or greatly heightened, prima
facie constitutional violation. Both free speech and equal protection prin-
ciples condemn any discrimination among speakers which is based on what
they intend to say."" One must assume that the court either did not notice
this apparent inconsistency, or felt it unnecessary, for some reason, to
explain it. Either alternative leaves the unanswered question of whether
an equal protection standard of review can be properly invoked under
circumstances of federal agency regulation. The problem, however, is not
so much one of analytical difficulty as it is one of infrequency. Situations
of alleged equal protection violation by the federal government or its duly
authorized agencies are relatively rare. The Supreme Court has said that
due process, as embodied in the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and
equal protection, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, are both directed toward the ideal of fairness, and are not mutually
GOBusiness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 247 (1970).
0 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(McGowan, C.J., dissenting).
062The other branch of the equal protection argument, which holds that the deprivation of a
fundamental right such as freedom of speech requires a compelling state interest, rests upon the
assumption of a public interest in speaking, hence it is subject to the same objections raised
above in the defective fairness doctrine discussion.
63 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 650 n,13 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
04 Id. at 660.
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exclusive.a In declaring school segregation in the District of Columbia
violative of due process, the Supreme Court said that, although due process
and equal'protection are not always interchangeable, "[1iberty under law
extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue,
and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective." ,;"
Since that time the scarce litigation involving the issue has sustained the
proposition that the abstract principle of equal protection is equally applic-
able to state and federal government alike.07
Equating a forum or place of communication with a means of communi-
cation, albeit without precedent, should not raise objection. To distinguish
the interests that attach to a public forum, such as a park, from those
that attach to television and radio for purposes of guaranteeing an open
marketplace of ideas would be at best tenuous, and, to date, has not been
advanced. The only remaining untested premise of the "paramount right"
approach is that discrimination against political advertisers in favor of com-
mercial advertisers is sufficiently invidious to require a compelling state
reason.
B. The Court's Choice.
Considering the rationale of the two approaches suggested by the court,
together with their respective points of possible vulnerability, it is appro-
priate to determine which, if either, represents the court's ultimate grounds
for a right of access. Despite the fact that attack is advanced against the
"defective fairness doctrine" idea by opponents of a right of access, it can
be strongly argued that the opinion of the court is properly construed as
holding for a right of access regardless of the successful or unsuccessful
operation of the fairness doctrine. To be sure, the court refuted both lines
of argument. The right of the public to receive ideas was spoken of as a
public interest, but not its only interest, in the media.68 An additional, and
more important right, is the right of self-expression, which can only be
realized through recognition of a right to speak. The rationale underlying
this condusion is that '[t]he First Amendment values of individual self-
fulfillment through expression and individual participation in public de-
bate have long been recognized." ' Such a position is quite tenable: what
value, it may be asked, would a right to receive have if exclusive control
over who may speak is in the hands of the broadcaster? The media could
represent both ideological sides of the Vietnam war without the public
ever learning that an organization of over 2,700 business owners and execu-
6 5 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
66 d. at 499-5 00.
67See, e.g., Oregon v. Mfitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966).
68 Business Executives' Move for Viemam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6o Id. at 655.
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tives had combined for the express purpose of voicing opposition to the war.
Hence the deprivation of initiative permitted under the fairness doctrine
violates an essential aspect of the public's freedom of expression. Like-
wise, the licensee's exclusive control of editing and format instills an un-
avoidable bias in all issue presentation, largely because the condensing and
abbreviating process must necessarily reflect what the broadcaster considers
to be important and interesting." The truth of this conclusion is even less
disputable than the gravity of the problem. The importance of the format,
time, and mode of presentation to the impact of an idea, for instance as
publicized by Marshall McLuhan,71 exemplifies an increasing awareness by
the academic world of the enormous amount of power held by those who
control the media.
It is interesting to note that the court, in refuting the arguments ad-
vanced in favor of the fairness doctrine, has built an insurmountable bar-
rier to its ever being adequate. This is because there is no authority for
compelling the licensee to relinquish editing control or the power of initi-
ating issues. The fairness doctrine is simply not adequate to fully protect
the public's first amendment interests in the media. Why, then, does the
court construct a theory of discrimination against controversial ideas being
prima facie unconstitutional in light of the public's "paramount right" in
the media? The reason would seem to lie in the implications of proving
discrimination, as opposed to proving a defective fairness doctrine. It
does not follow from the fact that a particular procedure fails to provide
the public with initiative and editing control in the media, that a right
of access is constitutionally required. There may be alternatives which
can both satisfy the first amendment and yet avoid declaring an absolute,
though limited, right of access. But it does follow that if an unconstitu-
tional discrimination among ideas is being made based upon their content,
then a cessation of discrimination is constitutionally required. A right of
access becomes a necessary rather than a permissible alternative. This is
analogous to saying that once racial discrimination has been proven, the
operation of a separate-but-equal doctrine, or any other mitigating pro-
cedure, is entirely irrelevant because the discrimination itself is unconsti-
tutional. Strength for this characterization is evidenced by the fact that
the court did not remand this case for a determination of how the public's
first amendment rights might better be protected, but rather declared that
"to single out and exclude editorial advertising is to violate the First Amend-
ment of the Constitution." 72
7o Id. at 655-56.
71 H. McLUHAN, THE Mium is THE MASSEGE (Random House ed. 1967).
72 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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C. The Public's Paramount Right
Determining which constitutional argument the court relied upon in
fashioning a right of access does not, of course, reflect upon the soundness
of that argument's reasoning. Assuming arguendo the validity of the un-
derlying assumptions that a medium of communication is constitutionally
comparable to a place of communication, and that equal protection stan-
dards can be applied to the federal government, it must still be shown that
discrimination based upon the content of ideas is constitutionally prohibited
and that the practical difficulties of allowing a limited right of access do
not constitute a "compelling" or "overriding" state interest. Traditional
equal protection review was limited to situations of invidious discrimina-
tion, the most common being arbitrary classifications based on race, color,
or national origin. Prohibition of discrimination by content of ideas is a
relatively new concept, but has received unbroken judicial support since
its inception. The general principle is that a forum, once open to some
form of communication, even if privately owned, must not be used in a
manner allowing arbitrary censorship of selected ideas. The six cases cited
by the court as supporting its ban against "discriminations among types
of speech" 73 were discussed in detail by Commissioner Johnson in his dis-
sent from the FCC's original ruling against BEM. 4 The forums in which
commercial advertising was accepted and political advertising strictly for-
bidden were a college newspaper,7 a high school newspaper," the New
York subway,77 and two municipal bus lines.7  Without exception, it was
held that the policy of forbidding editorial advertising when paid com-
mercial advertising was accepted amounted to unconstitutional censorship
of free speech.
It is difficult to imagine any reasonable method of distinguishing the
policy against political advertising condemned in the above cases and that
applied by the licensee to BEM. Subway walls, newspaper pages, and buses
(both exterior and interior) are, together with radio and television, the
business world's most common method of reaching potential customers.
All function in an identical manner, attempting to communicate an idea,
albeit commercial, to the masses of people coming into contact with the
particular forum. The FCC asserted that the above cases are inapposite
because the forums are "government affiliated entities whose major pur-
731Id. at 659.
74 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 268-71 (1970) (Johnson,
Comm'r., dissenting).
75 Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 441
F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
76 Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supj,. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
77 Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
7 8 Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 455 P.2d 350 (Wash., 1969); Wirta
v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal. 2d 51, "64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
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poses are for the most part unrelated to informing the public and who are
in any event under no statutory duty to do so."79 Such a distinction would
'seem, however, to make a better case for the analogy than against it, as a
forum that exists for the express purpose of communication especially
ought to be susceptible to first amendment constraints. Indeed, the reaction
of the courts has been one of indignation at the "perversity of elevating
commercial speech to a status more important than political speech.' 80
Broadcast licensees are hard pressed to escape the analogy that invalidates
a policy that discriminates against political ideas yet allows commercial
ones, absent, of course, sufficient countervailing facts.
The final argument by which the FCC might have attempted to dis-
prove a limited right of access would have been a positive showing of
practical burdens sufficient to at least override the public's free speech in.
terests. Although this is where the licensee's specific objections to a right
of access might best be argued, it is an area that was almost completely
ignored by the FCC. Addressing itself to the question of BEM's first
amendment rights in its original ruling, the FCC said merely that a licensee
may exercise his judgment as he sees fit, and that "[i]f the licensee were
required to present any matter brought to him which was not obscene, etc.,
the result would be not only chaotic but a wholly different broadcasting
system which Congress has not chosen to adopt."'" This criticism seems
to be directed toward an unlimited right of access. Were that the issue,
it might be of some merit, but standing alone, it hardly defeats a limited
right of access.
On appeal, the FCC asserted that the policy considerations were not in
issue in BEM and hence the court should not even consider them in relation
to a right of access.82 The reasoning was that the FCC properly found
that the public's free speech rights did not include a right to speak, but
rather only a right to receive that which the licensee, in conformity with
the fairness doctrine, chose to disseminate, hence the question of what
policy considerations might outweigh such a right were not at issue. This
followed from the distinction made by the FCC that the cases in point
regarding discrimination against the content of ideas were inapplicable.
The FCC did point out what it considered to be some of the problems with
a right of access, but said that "[wle have attempted no detailed analysis
because this would appear to be plainly an area where the Commission's
reasoning rather than the arguments of counsel should be before the
79 Brief for Respondent at 17, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450
F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
8 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 269 (1970) (Johnson,
Comm'r., dissenting).
811d. at 248.
82 Brief for Respondent at 20, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450
F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Court."s8 3 Past this somewhat cryptic introduction, the FCC characterized
a licensee's burden as: (1) chaos resulting from a loss of broadcaster con-
trol; (2) control of access by wealthy interests, and; (3) financial ruin
by virtue of the fairness doctrine's requirement of reply time to editorial
messages which must be free of charge when necessary.M
Arguments (1) and (3) were dismissed by the court rather sum-
marily with a reminder of the narrowness of the holding. Neither chaos
nor financial ruin need be the product of a requirement permitting some
editorial advertising. Such consequences will not materialize so long as
the FCC and licensees utilize their "broad latitude to develop 'reasonable
regulations' which will avoid any possibility of chaos and confusion."85
The more difficult problem is that of possible domination of a right to ac-
cess by wealthy groups or individuals. While acknowledging the serious-
ness of this claim, the court approached the problem with the view that
"the mere fact that wealthy people may use their opportunities to speak
more effectively than other people is not enough to justify eliminating those
opportunities entirely."' 0 The solution to inequities rests again on the
"Commission's ability to set down guidelines which avoid that danger."8-s
The -ease with which the court disposed of the Commission's arguments is
surely due, in no smaU part, to the lack of importance attached to and
thought devoted to their preparation. In underestimating the constitutional
limits of inquiry to be reached by this court of appeals, the Commission
failed to explore and develop the genuine difficulties that might have at
least prompted the court to articulate a less simplistic solution. As ad-
vanced, the relatively minor administrative problems, in all likelihood, can
indeed be dealt with by a reasonable regulatory scheme.
D. Issues Not Reached by the Court
The greatest obstacles to even a limited right of access, following from
the court's belief in the Commission's ability to regulate the media and
hence justify access to it, are those countervailing consequences which the
Commission may not be able to effectively control. These elements are
what must be considered in striking the balance between the public's first
amendment rights and opposing considerations. Two areas of concern
invite analysis: the first is the nature of the group seeking access, and the
szcond is the constitutional status of an inadequately funded group seek-
ing access.
Given the broad nature of the court's approval of editorial advertising,
83 Id. at 22.
84 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85 Id. at 663.
s6 Id. at 664.
87 Id.
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one must still ask if some things are too controversial to be permitted
access. The most obvious example would seem to be obscenity, the presen-
tation of which would be barred under any public issue doctrine because of
accepted standards of what may be permissibly broadcast to the general
public at large. However, other situations do not lend themselves to such
clear cut resolution. If the Klu Klux Klan may be covered on news pro-
grams and documentaries, is it to be prohibited from buying commercial
time to advertise its view on an unquestionably controversial subject? It
is difficult to anticipate how a court might distinguish contexts of permis-
sible controversy, or degrees of controversy beyond which a right of access
would not extend. The obvious dilemma that ensues is a right to present
that which is morally objectionable to a substantial portion of the audience,
land morally humiliating to a particular segment. Many issue oriented
groups might conceivably raise such a problem, e.g., the American Nazi
Party, the John Birch Society, etc. The FCC would be hard pressed to
exclude such groups under any reasonable regulation that would at the same
time permit the converse view to be broadcast. Contrarily, if permitted
and done "in good taste," as might be possible, the effect on the voluntary
sponsorship that supplies a majority of the media's funding could well be
:devastating.
An even greater problem can be foreseen when one considers the impact
of the suspect criterion branch of the new equal protection upon a right
of access. The court in BEA1 used this analysis in determining the uncon-
stitutionality of discrimination based upon the content of ideas. However,
the United States Supreme Court has also decided that wealth is a suspect
criterion,8 and consequently that, absent a compelling state interest, classi-
fications cannot be made based upon it. Applied to the doctrine under
consideration, there would seem to be little doubt that a licensee would be
barred from discriminating against a group seeking access solely because
that group could not afford to pay the standard fee for advertising. This
would produce, in effect, a free right of access for those groups. But how
does the licensee determine who, amongst competing under-funded inter-
ests, deserves the free time he is required to give? What should be the
proper ratio of free time to paid time, and should the criteria include the
solvency of the licensee, or the nature of the editorials? These and other
substantive problems suggest that "reasonable regulations" may not com-
pletely counterbalance the burden of the licensee.
VI. CONCLUSION
The beginning of this discussion focused upon the shortcomings and
inequities of the fairness doctrine itself. Assuming that a limited right of
88 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. Cali.
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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access withstands appeal to the United States Supreme Court, its ultimate
benefit, notwithstanding the drawbacks noted above, might be most ap-
propriately measured in terms of its effect upon those problems. Defini-
tional difficulties were discussed at the outset, illuminating the vagueness
of concepts such as "controversial" and "a reasonable and good faith ef-
fort." Does a limited right of access afford any relief in this area? With-
out question, those who are frustrated by an adverse FCC interpretation of
these concepts now have a viable avenue of redress. It is also reasonable
to believe that those topics that fell outside the Commission's construction
of controversial, for example, religion, so as to render the fairness doctrine
inapplicable, are still issues of sufficient public importance to qualify for
editorial advertising. This is to say that implicit in a right of access is the
fact that it cannot be denied simply because the licensee deems something
non-controversial. To reason otherwise would defeat the express first
amendment function of a right of access of preserving an "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"89 forum for the exchange of ideas. The effect of
sanctions available but never used against those who would violate the
spirit, if not the letter, of the fairness doctrine is also reduced significantly.
The injunctive relief available for improper administration of a right of ac-
cess will satisfy the complaining party more quickly and more appropriately
than disciplinary action under the fairness doctrine. Appeal from FCC
rulings and regulations is still possible for those displeased with any appli-
cation of the new doctrine to their particular situation. One of the most
encouraging changes insured by a right of access is that a licensee can no
longer avoid controversial subject matter altogether, the bane of those
who dispair blandness in the media. Unless he carries no advertising
whatsoever," the licensee, even though he still lacks an affirmative obli-
gation to initiate the presentation of controversial issues, now has an obli-
gation to accept at least some editorial advertising. Though subject to
reasonable regulation, there can be no doubt that this change signals a
new trend for public involvement and influence of its own affairs.
Despite the issues not raised by the FCC and hence not reached by the
court, the balance of constitutionality still weighs heavily in favor of the
public's right of access. Both the inequity of selling time to commercial
manufacturers while denying it to public interest groups, and the unfair-
ness of leaving complete and total editorial control of the most significant
means of mass communication in the world in the hands of a few select
people persuade one that a right of access is indispensable. Jerome Bar-
ron, one of the most noted commentators in the field, has asked "how cru-
cial to the communication at issue is access to the forum in question?"
89 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 655 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
90 An issue not yet resolved is the applicability of a right of access to a licensee who does not
accept any paid advertisin&
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and has answered that "wherever there are public facilities through which
large numbers of people can be easily reached, there is a right of access
to those facilities by groups interested in using them for purposes of politi-
cal expression."'"
Robert L. Beals
91 Barron, An Emerging Right of Access, 37 GEo. WASH. L. RUv. 487, 494 (1969).
